影子银行体系的监管问题--基于最优资本监管模型的分析

Regulation of Shadow Banking System——Analysis Based on a Model of Optimal Capital Regulation

本文结合当前影子银行的国际监管现状及我国的实际情况,对Plantin(2012)构建的最优资本监管模型进行拓展。模型分析表明,引入影子银行后,对传统银行更加严格的监管会导致影子银行的活动更加活跃,并降低社会总体福利。因此,为提高社会福利,应避免对传统银行过于严格的管制。对影子银行的活动,在传统银行受监管较严时实行部分监管,而在传统银行受监管较松时实行全面的监管。考虑到我国影子银行体系发展的特殊性,继续推进利率市场化改革,营造更为宽松的金融信贷环境,有助于减少监管套利;正确引导和规范影子银行要优于对其严格的管制。

Considering the current situation of the international regulation of shadow banks system and its actual development in China, the paper expands the model of optimal capital regulation developed by Plantin （2012）. The model shows that increasing the regulatory burden on the traditional banks may create a surge in shadow banking in the presence of a shadow banking system and decrease the overall welfare. The social optimal policy is to avoid too strict controls over the traditional banks, to regulate the shadow banking system partially while the traditional banks are regulated tightly, and to regulate it thoroughly while the traditional banks are regulated loosely. Taking into account the particularity of China＇s shadow banking system, we need continue to promote market reform of interest rate and build a more relaxed financial environment, so as to reduce the regulatory arbitrage. Meanwhile, imposing correct and rational guidance for the shadow banking is better than taking strict control over it.