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对亚里士多德主义虚构对象理论的批评

Criticisms of Aristotelian Theories of Fictional Objects
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摘要 虚构对象是小说、神话、传说中虚构地进行描写的对象,如福尔摩斯、哈姆雷特、孙悟空。关于虚构对象的形而上学主要研究两个基本问题:(1)我们的本体论是否应该包含虚构对象;(2)假如应该包含虚构对象,虚构对象属于什么范畴。针对问题(1),不同回答导致关于虚构对象的实在论和反实在论争论。在对问题(1)做肯定回答的基础上,对问题(2)的不同回答导致不同的虚构对象理论。虚构对象理论可分为亚里士多德主义和柏拉图主义。亚里士多德主义者认为。 Fictional objects is a central topic in Metaphysics.One basic controversy about fictional objects is 'if there are such entities,what category do they belong to?'According to Aristotelism,fictional objects are contingent entities.There are mainly three different approaches in this line,i.e.,Possibilism,Idealism and Creationism.According to Possibilism,fictional objects are purely possible objects.According to Idealism,fictional objects are ideas.And according to Creationism,fictional objects are abstract artifacts.We will argue against these three kinds of theories separately.Based on these arguments,we have good reasons to think that Aristotelism is far from a satisfactory thesis.
作者 徐敏
出处 《哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第7期50-57,128-129,共8页 Philosophical Research
基金 国家社科基金青年项目"虚构对象理论前沿研究"(编号10CZX032) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"二阶模态公理化虚构对象理论SMLM"(编号2010QN068) 华中科技大学人文社科基金青年项目"科学哲学视角下的虚构对象研究"(编号2009011)
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参考文献20

  • 1徐敏.虚构对象实在论的语义辩护[J].世界哲学,2011(4):133-142. 被引量:2
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二级参考文献21

  • 1F. Adams, G. Fuller, R. Stecker, "The Semantics of Fictional Names", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 78, No. 2, 1997, pp. 128-148.
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  • 10W V. Quine, " On What There Is ", in his From A Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, 1961.

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