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保障性住房中各主体之间的博弈分析

Game Analysis among Main Bodies of Affordable Housing
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摘要 在我国的住房市场中,保障性住房是很重要的组成成分,其福利性的特点使其与一般的商品房在开发与运作上有明显的不同。然而长期以来,由于中央政府、地方政府、开发商之间种种制约因素和局部利益冲突,使得保障性住房并没能够发挥住房保障的作用。文章通过对中央政府与地方政府,地方政府与开发商分别建立"智猪博弈"模型、委托-代理关系模型,剖析问题根源所在,寻求解决保障性住房问题的途径,并提出相对应的对策与建议。 Affordable housing is a very important component in our housing market. Because of its welfare, there are significantly different ways of operation between commercial housing and affordable housing. However, the central government, local government and developers have various constraints and conflicts of interest among them, so the affordable housing could not play the role of housing support. In this paper "Pigs Game" model and principal-agent theory are used to analyses the root of the problem and find a solution of the affordable housing problem. Finally, some corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are proposed.
作者 孟醒 汤平平
出处 《价值工程》 2012年第22期172-174,共3页 Value Engineering
关键词 保障性住房 地方政府 中央政府 开发商 博弈 affordable housing local government central government developer game
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