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分权体制下中俄地方官员激励机制及其经济行为选择比较--2000年以来的相似性和差异性 被引量:1

A Comparative Study of Motivation Mechanisms and Choices in Economic Behaviours of Chinese and Russian Local Officials under the Decentralized Institution——Similarities and Differences since 2000
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摘要 中俄两国经济增长差异与地方官员行为的关系问题,是一个备受关注的话题。通过观察分析两国政治架构和具有分权性质的财政激励机制的异同,探索两国转型现阶段不同激励机制下地方官员在经济高速增长过程中的行为选择差异,有助于找出两者之间的联系。转型过程中垂直政治领导和财政分权体系对地方官员的经济行为选择有着重要影响。其中,2000年以来俄罗斯中央政府对地方官员任免与升迁的控制,有效地缓解了财政分权激励下地方官员发展经济的积极性动力不足的问题,从而解决了转型早期产权保护缺失下市场混乱和经济衰退的问题。这也印证了中国长期坚持的地方官员增长锦标赛与财政分权相结合的有效性。但与此同时,中国部分地方官员中出现了只追求发展的高指标,而对辖区内居民生活福利的问题有所忽视的问题,对教育、医疗卫生、环境等非经济性公共物品的供给远低于俄罗斯。这一问题仍需要探讨。 The relationship between differences of economic growth of both China and Russia and local officials' behaviors is a topic that attracts much attention. Through observing and analyzing both differences and similarities between both countries' political structures and fiscal motivation mechanisms, characterized by decentralization, this paper explores different behavioral choices of local officials in both countries during the process of rapid economic growth at this transition stage in order to f'md out their relationship. The study finds that, during the transition process, the vertical political leadership and the fiscal decentralization system impose a vital effect on local officials' economic behavioral choices. Since 2000, Russia's central government has had control over the appointment and promotion of local officials, which has effectively alleviated local officials' lack in motivation to achieve economic growth under the fiscal decentralization system. Accordingly, the problem of market chaos and economic recession, due to lack of protection of property rights during Russia's early transition, has been solved as well. This has also proved it effective for China to combine its local officials' championship for economy growth and fiscal decentralization. Meanwhile, however, some Chinese local officials are only in pursuit of rapid development while ignoring the welfare of local residents. The supply of such non-economic public goods as education, health care and environment in China is much less than that of Russia. As a result, this issue needs further discussion.
出处 《俄罗斯研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第3期174-196,共23页 Russian Studies
基金 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地辽宁大学转型国家经济政治研究中心年度重大课题“转型政治经济学导论”(项目批准号:10JJDGJW009)的阶段性成果
关键词 分权 中俄 地方官员 激励 Decentralization, China and Russia, Local Officials, Incentive
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