摘要
我国债转股的初衷在于解救陷入“危机”之中的银行与企业 ,从中达到“双赢”的理想境界。然而理性的人们已经认识到债转股所带来的效应可能远非想象中的最优 ,债转股的风险与收益并存。可以说 ,我国债转股处于矛盾的处境之中 ,它一方面化解风险 ,另一方面又可能滋生新的风险。而风险的产生必有其根源 ,通过较详尽的理论分析 ,本文诠释了债转股风险的生成机理 ,否定“风险源于时机欠佳”的看法 ,指出在已有的现实条件下 ,为债转股本身设计的机制欠妥是风险产生的真正源头。并且据此提出最小化债转股风险的途径 :为债转股设计最优机制安排。
The initial purpose of china's Debt\|to\|Equity Swap is to save the banks and the enterprises who have being trapped in “crises”and finally achieve the ideal state of “two\|side win”.But rational people have realized the effect of Debt\|to\|Equity Swap is far from the optimum.On the one hand,it eliminates the existing bank risks.On the other hand,it also generates new risks.So that is to say,Debt\|to\|Equity Swap is in the contradiction.Meanwhile,this paper explains the generation principle of the Debt\|to\|Equity Swap's risk using detailed theoretic analysis,denies the idea that the risks derive from unsuitable opportunity and then points out the true origin of the Debt\|to\|Equity Swap's risk is the unsuitable mechanism which is devised for Debt\|to\|Equity Swap under the existing condition.Therefore,we offer the method of minimizing the Debt\|to\|Equity Swap's risk,that is,devising the optimal mechanism arrangement for current Debt\|to\|Equity Swap.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第5期108-112,共5页
Journal of Financial Research