摘要
以1993至2009年上市公司IPO过程中无形资产的剥离和付费信息为基础,本文分析了IPO时资产重组的影响因素及其经济后果。我们的研究发现,大股东后续获取控制权收益的成本越低,就越有可能在IPO时保留无形资产的所有权,并在IPO后安排更多与之相关的关联交易。本文的研究结果表明,大股东在IPO时和上市后如何从上市公司获取收益最终都取决于其获取控制权收益的成本,因此,保护中小股东的利益要从完善制度环境、改善公司治理以提高大股东获取控制权收益的成本入手。
By investigating stripping and charging decisions of intangible assets in IPOs for the Chinese listed companies from 1993 to 2009, this paper studies the influential factors and economic consequences of asset restructuring in the process of IPO. We find that large shareholders who have a lower cost to get private benefit of control are more likely to keep the ownership of intangible asset, and those large shareholders also arrange more connected transactions after IPO. Our results imply the cost of getting private benefit of control is the key factor influencing the tunneling behavior of large shareholder around IPO, which means protection of minority shareholder should be focused on improving institutional environment and corporate governance to increase the cost of getting private benefit of control.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第7期154-167,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(项目批准号:70872055)
关键词
资产剥离
无形资产
控制权收益
Asset stripping, Intangible asset, Private benefits of control