摘要
构建原材料供需失衡条件下农产品供应链质量安全博弈模型,对原材料供应商和生产商的行为进行定量分析。研究发现,模型存在3个均衡,分别代表农产品供应链质量风险高、中、低3种情况,不同均衡出现的条件取决于外界对供应商和生产商的质量检查水平。在原材料供应商随机掺假的情况下,市场的原材料供应越紧张,农产品供应链质量风险越高。研究结论为农产品质量安全监管机构的政策制定提供一定的理论依据。
A game model on quality safety of agriculture supply chain under the imbalance of supply and demand of materials is established to quantitatively analyze the behaviors of material suppliers and producers of agriculture products. The research shows that three equilibriums exist which respectively represent high, medium and low quality risk of agriculture supply chain. The condition that three equilibriums occur is dependent on quality inspection level of environment on suppliers and producers. If suppliers adulterate randomly,the quality risk of agriculture supply chain is higher when the material is more insufficient. The conclusions provide a theoretical basis for the policy setting of agriculture product quality safety regulators.
出处
《科技与管理》
2012年第4期83-87,共5页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173123)
教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJA630127)
教育部人文社会科学项目(11YJC630233)
浙江省教育厅项目(Y200907345)
关键词
供需失衡
农产品供应链
质量安全
博弈论
imbalance of supply and demand
agriculture supply chain
quality safety
game theory