渠道中不同机会主义的管理:合同的双维度与关系规范的作用研究

Managing Different Types of Opportunistic Behavior in Marketing Channel:Effects of Two Dimensions of Contracts and Relational Norms

本文将机会主义区分为积极的和消极的,将合同细分成包容性和约束力两维度,研究合同的双维度与关系规范在治理不同渠道机会主义时各自及其交互的作用。实证研究表明:①合同的包容性会同时增加渠道成员积极和消极机会主义;合同的约束力会减少渠道成员的积极机会主义;②关系规范可降低积极和消极机会主义;③关系规范可强化合同的约束力在降低积极机会主义、弱化合同的包容性在增加消极机会主义方面的作用,但在弱化合同的包容性增加积极机会主义方面并无显著效果。本文对于机会主义表现形式、治理机制设计及效力的实证研究有突出的理论启示,也为企业诊断具体的渠道机会主义、设计适宜的治理机制提供了指导性建议。

Prior empirical research has failed to recognize the dif- ferent types of behavior that are hidden behind the general oppor- tunism label. Furthermore, the extant empirical research regards contract as a unidimensional construct. In fact, contract is a multi- faeeted construct, and its different dimension has distinctive feature and focus which exerts different effects on opportunistic behavior. In addition, the individual and combined effectiveness of contract and relational norms on controlling opportunism has yielded con- tradictory evidences. Accordingly, this article divides opportunistic behavior into active opportunistic behavior and passive opportu- nistic behavior, and studies contracts from two dimensions： issue inclusiveness and contractual obligatoriness. The purpose of the active opportunistic behavior is to obtain more interests, the passive opportunistic behavior aims to reduce the costs or expenditures. Both represent commission and omission respectively. Issue in- clusiveness shows the extent to which relevant issues are included, and contractual obligatoriness represents the extent to which each party involved in a contract is restrained by the binding force of the contract. This article investigates the effects of two dimensions of contracts and relational norms on managing opportunism individu- ally and in combination. Eight hypotheses are developed and tested using survey data from 206 dealers of the furniture, computer and its components industries. The authors selected senior executives of the dealers as key respondents for the survey. They conducted the field data collection over a three-month period by using on-site structured interviews.The empirical research shows： ① issue in- clusiveness increases the passive opportunistic behavior and active opportunistic behavior; contractual obligatoriness decreases the active opportunistic behavior; ② relational norms can reduce the passive opportunistic behavior and active opportunistic behavior; ③ relational norms can strengthen the decreasing effect of contrac- tual obligatoriness on active opportunistic behavior, and weaken the increasing effect of issue inclusiveness on passive opportunistic behavior; but they can＇t weaken the increasing effect of issue inclu- siveness on active opportunistic behavior. Theoretically, the study has important implication for the empirical research on different types of opportunism, the design of the governance mechanisms and their effects. Practically, it provides several suggestions about how to identify different types of opportunism and design appropri- ate governance mechanisms.