摘要
防御性医疗是医疗服务提供者基于"经济人"理论与预期效用理论的理性选择。风险厌恶与预期效用最大化是防御性医疗的经济学基础。医疗过失判断的不确定性及巨额的责任风险是防御性医疗的法律制度基础。信息的不对称性及供给与需求的非市场性是防御性医疗的市场基础。它是医疗过失诉讼制度在市场经济体制下不可剥离的副产品。纯粹的禁止性立法不足以制止防御性医疗。《侵权责任法》第63条很难收到预期的立法效果,建议对医疗过失诉讼制度的运用及医疗损害赔偿的额度进行合理限制。
Defensive medicine is a rational choice of medical service provider based on "economic man" and expected utility theory. Risk aversion and expected utility maximization are economics foundation, uncertainty for medical malpractice judgment and huge liability risk are legal system basement and information asymmetry and sup- ply inducing demand are market foundation of defensive medicine. It is byproduct that can not be peel from medical negligence litigation under market economy system. Pure prohibition legislation is not enough to stop defensive med- icine and it is difficult to receive desired legislation effect of sixty - third of "tort law". This paper suggests that we should limit the medical malpractice litigation system and medical injury compensation reasonable.
出处
《法学杂志》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第8期140-144,共5页
Law Science Magazine
关键词
医疗过失诉讼
防御性医疗
经济人
预期效用理论
侵权责任法
medical negligence litigation defensive medicine economic man expected utility theory Tort law