摘要
民营上市公司终极控制人的自利性多元化不仅直接影响了中小投资者和债权人的利益,投资和破产政策的扭曲同时也损害了企业价值。本文收集2006-2009年我国A股市场179家民营上市公司进行实证分析,我们将民营上市公司分为直接上市和间接上市两种类型。实证研究表明,间接上市的民营上市公司的实际控制人可能存在利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益,而直接上市民营上市公司的侵占效应不显著。因此,如何保护投资者的合法权益,抑制上市公司自利动机的多元化经营行为,应该成为关注的话题。
The irrational diversified investment of the ultimate control in private listed companies has effect not only on minority shareholders and creditors' benefit, but also on the loss of enterprise value as a result of the investment and bankruptcy policy. We made empirical test using 179 private list companies in Chinese stock market between 2006 -2009. We divided the list private companies into direct listed private companies and indirect listed private companies. The result is consistent with the model. The results indicate the fact that the controllers of private listed companies are intended to implement diversification for self - interests. As a result, how to protect invest invertors' interests and restrain the self - interest motive of diversification is an issue of increasing concern.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
2012年第8期29-42,共14页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
广东省自然科学基金项目"基于不同上市方式的民营企业多元化战略价值取向研究"(项目编号:S2011040004457)
广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划2011年度学科共建项目"基于融资约束和代理成本的民营企业投资行为
投资效率和企业价值研究"
(项目编号:GD11XYJ16)的资助
关键词
多元化
金字塔持股结构
民营企业
上市方式
diversification, pyramid shareholding, private -controlled listed companies, listing way