环境责任保险制度实施的博弈分析

Analysis on the Implementation of Environmental Liability Insurance System Based on the Game Theory

从博弈论的角度分析了环境责任保险制度的实施,运用静态博弈对政府环保部门、潜在污染企业和保险公司三者之间相互博弈过程进行了全面分析,研究了潜在污染企业在缴纳保险和不缴纳保险两种情况下的收益情况,以及环境事故发生概率对政府环保部、潜在污染企业和保险公司两两博弈中的影响,论证了政府环保部门强制潜在污染企业缴纳环境责任保险的必要性,并且政府要给予承保环境责任保险的保险公司一定的补贴是最合理的决策,而且证明了发生事故的概率在企业决策中起着重要的作用。

This paper, from the perspective of the theory , analyses the implementation of environmental liability insurance system. Using static game to analyse the pairwise game process for the government department of envi- ronmental protection, potential pollution enterprise and insurance company, studied the yield of the potential pol- lution enterprise on two kinds of situations in pay insurance and not pay insurance, and the occurrence probability of environmental accident how to affect government, potential pollution enterprise and insurance companies, This paper demonstrates the necessity of the government environmental protection department force the potential pol- luted enterprises to pay environmental liability insurance, and the most reasonable decision is that government must give certain subsidy to the insurance companies that accept the environmental liability insurance, proved that the accident probability play an important role in the enterprise decision-making.