随机需求下两条供应链的货架展示量竞争与链内协调研究

Study on SC Competition in Shelf-display-quantity Between Two SCs and SC Coordinative within SC with Stochastic Demand

针对两条分别由单生产商单零售商组成的替代产品供应链,假定两种产品的随机总需求依赖于总货架展示量、而每种产品的市场份额与其货架展示量成正比,利用均衡分析方法研究两条供应链在货架展示量与订货量方面的竞争均衡,分别建立了对应两条供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链一条为集中式供应链的EPEC、MPEC和Nash均衡模型。随后分析了供应链竞争下的链内协调合同设计问题,给出了同时协调零售商的货架展示量和订货决策的回购加线性补贴合同和收益共享加线性补贴合同。最后的算例表明,协调是供应链竞争下的占优策略,但两条供应链均协调时的利润反而低于均不协调时的利润,即存在囚徒困境现象。

Two supply chains（ SCs） providing substitute products are studied. Each SC consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. Under the assumption that the total stochastic demand of two products depends on their aggregate shelf-display-quantity, and the demand of each product is in proportion to its shelf-display-quantity, we make researches on the competition equilibrium of shelf - display - quantity and ordering between two SCs in three cases that both SCs are decentralized or centralized SCs, or they are one decentralized SC and one centralized SC by using the equilibrium analysis method. Corresponding EPEC, MPEC and Nash equilibrium models are set up respectively. How to coordinate one SC under SC competition by designing suitable contracts is analyzed. Two contracts such as buy-back plus linear subsidy contract and revenue - sharing plus linear subsidy con- tract are put forward, which can coordinate retailer~ both shelf - display - quantity and ordering decisions. Final- ly, the numerical example shows that SC coordination Trap may be existed that the profits of two centralized is dominant strategy under SC competition, but Prisoners SCs are lower than two decentralized SCs.