基于政府视角的国有创投跟进投资方式的效用价值研究

The Game Analysis on Utility Value of Government-owned Venture Capital Follow Investment Mode from the Perspective of Government

政府应参与到创业风险投资领域已达成共识,但是关于政府的参与方式问题依然存在争议。本文在委托代理理论的基础上,以多重任务的委托代理模型为原型,构建了政府与投资机构之间的委托代理模型。比较政府在直接投资方式和跟进投资方式的效用价值,得出在引导基金模式下,跟进投资与直接投资相比,政府的效用价值更优的结论,并通过统计数据进行了实证分析及验证。

Although government＇s participatory approach remains controversial, it has been reached a consensus that government should be involved in the field of venture capital investment. Based on the principal-agent theory and the prototype of multi-task principal-agent model, this paper builds a principal-agent model between the government and investment institutions. Comparing the utility value of direct investment and follow up investment, it is concluded that under the model of guidance funds, follow up investment brings government higher utility value than direct investment, and carry out an empirical analysis and verification based on statistical data.