基于互信息博弈的侧信道攻击安全风险评估

Side Channel Risk Evaluation Based on Mutual Information Game

侧信道攻击的攻防过程可以视为互信息博弈过程,博弈的双方分别为密码设备设计者(防御方)和攻击者。防御方的博弈目标是通过制定相关的防御策略,减少由侧信道泄漏所引发的局部风险和全局风险;对攻击方而言,其博弈目标正好与之相反。从制定安全策略、降低安全风险的角度出发,将互信息博弈理论引入密码芯片设计者(防御方)和攻击者的决策过程,考察攻防策略的选择对安全风险的影响,并结合互信息的量化方法,给出了Nash均衡条件下攻防双方的优化策略选择方法及Nash均衡下攻防双方的互信息收益。

Attack process of side channel attacks can be regarded as mutual information gambling process.Both sides of the game were cryptographic equipment designers（defense party） and the attacker.The game goal of defenders is formulated by the defense strategy to reduce local and global risk which caused by the side channels leakage;to attack side,the game target and to the contrary.From make safety strategy,reduce safety risk angle,mutual information game theoryis introduced in the decision-making process of the cryptographic chips designers（defense party） and the attacker,to investigate the attack and design tactics choice to security risks,and combined with the quantitative methods of the mutual information,give the optimization tactics selection method of the both sides of attack and design on Nash equilibrium conditions,give the mutual information benefits of the both sides of attack and design on Nash equilibrium.