薪酬安排在高管政治关联发挥作用中的治理功能考察——基于政治关联“双刃剑”效应的研究

The Governance Function Inspection of Compensation Arrangement Playing Role in Politically-connected Managers: Based on the Double-edged Sword Effect of Political Connections

中国经济转型时期,政治关联对民营企业具有"双刃剑"效应,而如何对政治关联高管进行激励则是考察"双刃剑"效应大小的关键。本文从公司内部治理机制角度,实证检验薪酬激励安排对政治关联"双刃剑"效应的治理作用。研究发现,对政治关联高管的激励越强,政治关联的"政府干预"作用越弱,而"关系"作用越强;同时表明,政治关联"双刃剑"效应的发挥受到公司内部治理机制的约束,是对以往政治关联研究的发展与深入,同时也为薪酬激励安排的治理作用提供了经验证据。

Political connections are a double-edged sword for the non-state-owned enterprises during the process of China＇s transition to a market economy. And how to motivate politically-con- nected managers is the key of the double-edged sword effect. This paper empirically examines the governance effect of compensation incentive contract on the double-edged sword effect. It is found that the better the incentive to managers, the weaker ＂government intervention＂ effect and the stronger the ＂Guanxi＂ effect of political connections. Our research suggests that the double-edged sword effect of political connections is influenced by the corporate governance mechanisms, which extends and deepens prior research on political connections and provides empirical evidence on the corporate governance effect of compensation incentive contract.