乳品企业对奶站的激励偏差与最优激励合约——基于多任务委托代理模型的分析

Dairy Enterprise to Dairy Stations Incentive Deviation and Optimal Incentive Contract——Based on Multitask Principle-agent Modal

奶站机会主义行为与其报酬激励机制不健全相关。"三聚氰胺"事件之后,乳企加强了奶站监管,但报酬激励机制不合理,依然无法从根本上抑制奶站机会主义行为。本文在阐述当前乳企对奶站的报酬激励方式及其产生的偏差和后果基础上,总结出奶站治理机制的三个主要特征:对奶农生产的依赖性、多任务性及其任务之间的相互依存性。在Hoslmstrom&Milgrom(1991)多任务委托代理模型框架下,揭示奶站最优激励契约均衡条件,并进一步探讨了奶站最优激励契约设计问题。结果表明,当前乳企对奶农"质量性激励的缺失",使奶站交易服务产出失去了现实基础,对奶站"数量激励的侧重",诱使奶站用数量性努力替代质量性努力,为奶站采取机会主义行为创造条件。

The opportunistic behavior of dairy station is related to its defective payment incentive system. The melamine event made the dairy station run under the watchful supervision of dairy company, however, its opportunistic behavior has been insuppressible duo to the defective payment incentive system. This paper delivers the incentive mechanism of dairy station, and then formulate it＇s deviation and outcomes, at last summarizes the three properties of dairy station governance mechanism. Those are milk-producing dependence, multi-task and interaction among tasks. Under the fi＇amework of multi-task principle agent modal, this paper reveals the equilibrium of optimal incentive contract of dairy station and further discusses the design of optimal incentive contract. In conclusion, the absence of qualitative incentive to dairy farmers makes the dairy station＇s service output lose Foundation and the emphasis on quantitative incentives to dairy station makes it has an inclination to substitute qualitative efforts for quantitative efforts. As a result, it makes opportunistic behavior of dairy station possible.