激励结构与中国地方政府对内对外行为差异

Incentive Structure and Chinese Local Governments' Behavior Differences in Internal and External Cooperation

对内地方保护与对外开放合作是我国地方政府行为的两个显著特征。本文通过一个简单的理论模型说明,晋升激励结构是决定中国地方政府在对内和对外行为选择差异的主要原因之一。在财政分权和地方政府竞争的条件下,中央政府以经济增长为核心的晋升锦标激励机制,导致地方政府实施地方保护和分割市场行为。而由于在对外合作中不存在晋升竞争的影响,使得地方政府积极开展对外经济合作。本文还进一步揭示了地方政府对内竞争与对外合作的动机、表现、后果,以及两种行为之间的内在联系,最后提出相关对策建议。

Local protection and opening - up cooperation are two prominent behavior characteristics of Chinese local governments. In this paper, a simple theoretical model shows that incentive structure is the main reason that determines the difference in local government internal and external behavior. Upon the fiscal decentralization and local government competition, the champion- ship mechanism of promotion adopted by the central government was based on the economic growth, this leads to the local government~ local protectionism and market segmentation. However without promotion competition in the external coopera- tion, local governments carry out the external economic cooperation. This paper further reveals the motivation, performance and consequence of local government internal competition and external cooperation as well as their intrinsic link, and finally makes relevant suggestions.