土地市场中开发商行贿表征的量化分析——基于Logistic模型及Moran指数的应用

Quantitative Analysis on the Bribery Behaviors of the Developers in Land Market:Based on the Application of Logistic Model and Moran Index

研究目的:以武汉、南京、广州三市为例,量化分析土地市场中开发商行贿的表征。研究方法:Logistic模型及Moran指数。研究结果:(1)开发商行贿在"供给"和"需求"两种力量的推动下进行;(2)开发商行贿具有区域集聚性和区域差异性。研究结论:(1)在宏观因素和微观因素的影响下,开发商行贿是出于对制度环境和企业实力通盘考虑后作出的理性选择,具有不得已而为之的被动性;(2)开发商行贿有一定的空间相关性,且高-高关联的特征最为显著。

The purpose of this study is to conduct a quantitative analysis on the bribery behaviors of the developers in land market, taking Wuhan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou as the cases. Methods of logistic model and moran index are employed. The resuhs show that 1 ） developers＇ bribery is driven by two forces i.e., the ＂supply＂ and ＂demand＂ forces;2） there are regional agglomeration and regional difference in developers＇bribery. The research concludes that 1 ）regarding the impact of macro and micro factors the bribery behaviors of the developers is a rational choice because developers have taken into account the overall condition based on the system environment and business strength, i.e., a passive behaviors; 2） bribery behaviors of the developers are spatially correlated, and the high-high correlation is most significant.