葛梯尔问题的现象学解构——兼论胡塞尔《逻辑研究》在知识论上的突破

The Phenomenological Deconstruction of the Gettier's Problem:The Epistemological Breakthrough of Husserl's Logical Investigations

JTB理论认为"知识即得到辩护或证明的真信念"。葛梯尔用两个反例对这一理论提出了质疑。胡塞尔《逻辑研究》在知识论上取得的突破在于,它在JTB理论的基础上进一步回答了如何对信念进行证实的问题,并把知识看成是我们关于某个对象的信念在关于这个对象的直观中得到充实的过程。站在胡塞尔现象学-知识论的立场上来看,无论是JTB理论还是葛梯尔对这一理论的质疑都存在不少问题。

The JTB Theory maintains that knowledge is the justified true belief. Gettier challenged this theory in his famousarticle titled 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' in 1963. Husserl's Logical Investigations not only contributed a solution to theproblem of the method of the justification of a belief, but also provided a new definition of 'knowledge'. For Husserl, knowing is aprocess of fulfillment of a thought through intuition. In the viewpoint of Husserl's phenomenological epistemology, both the JTBtheory and Gettier's impeachment to it are of no avail.