论大学学术同行评议中的利益冲突——以委托代理理论为视角

Conflicts of Interests of Academic Peer Review in University: Under the Perspective of the Principal-Agent Theory

学术同行评议是一种涉及价值判断的评价活动,是对某项学术工作的水平或重要性的鉴定。从委托代理理论来看,大学学术同行评议形成了一种嵌套式的委托代理关系结构。同行评议委托代理关系中的博弈模型表明,评审管理机构与评议专家很有可能因各自私人利益产生冲突。大学学术同行评议利益冲突的产生,源于委代双方的信息不对称、激励不相容以及契约不完备。因此,增加信息成本以防范利益冲突的可能性、注重职业伦理的"软"约束力作用及建立以奖惩机制为基础的同行评议反评估制度是防范利益冲突问题的有效策略。

Academic peer review is an evaluation activity involving value judgment, and it is the appraisement of quality or importance of the academic work. Academic peer review shows a nested relationship structure based on principal-agent theory. According to the game model of academic peer review commissioned by the agency relationship, it is very likely to trigger some conflicts of interests because of the private interests between the review management institutions and re- view experts, such as asymmetric information, incompatible incentive and incomplete contract which exist between the prin- cipal and the agent. In order to prevent the occurrence of eonfliets of interests, some effective measures may be taken such as increasing the information cost, strengthening occupation moral construction and establishing the system of evaluating academic peer review.