亏损企业慷慨捐赠的背后被引量：110

Corporate Donation among China's Money-losing Enterprises

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摘要本文以我国2004—2010年度亏损上市企业为研究样本,通过政府补助这一中介变量,研究政府的支持之手对企业捐赠这一资源付出行为的影响。研究发现亏损企业的捐赠行为确实受到了政府利益(补助)的影响,获得政府补助越多的民营亏损企业不论是捐赠意愿还是捐赠水平都显得更为突出,反映了在我国当前的制度背景下,政府在企业捐赠行为中起着重要作用,民营亏损企业捐赠的背后隐藏着基于政府利益(补助)的交换,在我国的企业捐赠中存在着基于互惠交换的理性捐赠行为,并且这种理性捐赠行为在一定程度上可以作为民营亏损企业未来发展前景的一种信号传递。 Choosing the loss listed companies in China during 2004 and 2010 as a study sample, we empirically studied the influence of government support on the corporate donation using government subsidies as a mediator variable. We have found that the government subsidies have significant effect on the donation in private loss corporations, which means that private loss corporations obtained more government subsidies would behave more actively and make more donation. This inflect that under the background of China＇s current system, the government plays a significant role in the corporate donation. The existence of reciprocal exchange behavior in China＇s corporate donation is, to some extent, the signal transmission of the enterprises＇ perspective to its future development.

作者李四海陆琪睿宋献中

机构地区暨南大学管理学院中国人民大学商学院

出处《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第8期148-160,共13页 China Industrial Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目"社会责任对企业价值影响的机理与测度研究"(批准号70972080) 暨南大学"宁静致远"工程项目"相关利益者公司治理与社会责任信息披露研究"(批准号12JNKY003)

关键词企业捐赠政府补助产权性质政治联系 corporate donation government subsidies property rights political connection

分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]

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