摘要
基于新兴市场的制度背景,本文以2009—2011在创业板上市的IPO公司为样本,综合动态分析了风险投资和风险投资联合差异对IPO前和锁定期结束当年的盈余管理的影响。研究发现,风险投资的参与影响了IPO公司的盈余管理,具体表现在风险投资的参与降低IPO前的盈余管理,以实现在锁定期结束当年的盈余反转,从而获得更高的股份减持收益。实证结果支持风险投资IPO行为的道德风险假设。在此基础上,研究还发现,在我国当期环境下,风险投资联合的差异增加了IPO前的盈余程度,却同时降低了锁定期结束当年的盈余管理程度,这说明风险投资联合并没有恶化风险投资的盈余管理,相反起到了抑制的作用。
Based the institutional background of newly emerging market, this paper analyzes the effect of theparticipation of Venture Capital and the diversity of venture capital syndicate on earnings management. By using the IPO companies in ChiNext Stock Market during 2009—2011 as sample, we find that the participation of Venture Capital significantly affects the earnings management, with reducing the discretionary accruals before IPO and enhancing the discretionary accruals after the expiration of equity lock-up period. Our finding supports the hypothesis of Venture Capital's moral hazard. In addition, we also find that the diversity of venture capital syndicate increases the earnings management before IPO and reduces the earnings management after the expiration of equity lock-up period. It shows that the diversity does not deteriorate the earnings management, on the contrary, it suppresses the opportunism of venture capital.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第7期48-56,97,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
中央高校基本科研经费项目(FRT-TP-12-122A)的支持