意识“难问题”的本质及其深层次问题研究

On the Essence and The Further Problem of "The Hard Problem of Consciousness"

意识"难问题"充分说明了现象意识,即我们心理生活主观的、定性的维度。它要求我们解释带有主观性和定性的状态为什么以及如何存在。一般来说,尽管认知神经科学在意识问题的解释中起着重要作用,但其却不能充当意识"难问题"的充分条件或必要条件。查尔莫斯正是立足于这一认识论困境,提出了以信息为基础的意识的非还原解释方案,以此为迎合"难问题"的解释性挑战提供了适当理由;同时着眼于此,我们可以揭示出意识"难问题"的深层次问题。然而,要想阐释这样一个更大的难题,其间必然会面临现象概念策略与表征主义的质疑。

＂The hard problem of consciousness＂ is to fully explain phenomenal consciousness-the subjective, qualitative dimension of our mental lives. So it will leave us wondering how and why there could be states with subjective, qualitative properties. Generally speaking, cognitive neuroscience plays a critical role in the explanation of consciousness, but it can not serve as the sufficient or nessary condition of ＂the hard prob- lem of consciousness＂. It is Chalmers that stands on the epistemological difficulties and presents a non-reductive explanation of consciousness on the basis of information. Thus this explanation will give us a good reason to meet the hard problem＇s explanatory challenge. And focusing on this, we can reveal the further problem of ＂the hard problem of consciousness＂. However, in order to explain such a harder problem, it will face the challenge from phenomenal concept strategy and representationalism.