摘要
在国有商业银行改革中,财务重组既是改革的起点,也是制约其后续改革的重要因素。本文以损失承担与资金注入主体的变化为切入点,对1998年以来国有商业银行财务重组模式及其变迁作了比较制度分析,思考了其政策约束效应。本文的结论是在财政部和央行交替主导四大行财务重组的背景下,由于重组过度依赖国有商业银行自身,"好银行/坏银行"模式的实际效果受到抑制,进而导致国有商业银行财务重组并非实质完成。这已成为利率市场化、银行运营市场化及AMC转型等金融改革的现实约束因素。
In process of the reform of China＇s state-owned commercial banks initiated by 1998, finan- cial restructuring was not only the starting point of reform but also a key factor which restricted the fur- thering of successive financial reform. According to the change of sector which was directly responsible for the losses and injected new capital, this article studied the evolution of the financial restructuring modes and its policy restraints. Though MOF and PBOC dominated the restructuring alternatively, financial re- structuring between 1998 and 2010 excessively relied on the Big Four banks themselves, which repressed the practical effect of the good/bad bank approach and meant that state--owned banks＇ restructuring didn＇t come to an end. It would impact on successive financial reform, such as interest rate liberalization, the transformation of AMC et al.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第8期71-80,共10页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
国家社科基金项目(08CJL003)
教育部人文社科基地重大项目"中国金融发展中的创新和监管问题研究"
中央财经大学青年创新团队支持项目
关键词
国有商业银行
财务重组
模式比较
政策约束
state owned commercial banks
financial restructuring
mode comparing
policy restraints
