上市公司信息披露制度的动态博弈分析

A Dynamic Game Theory Analysis about the Listed Company's Information Disclose

上市公司的信息披露可以看做一个涉及多个当事人的复杂博弈。本文通过博弈论的动态博弈方法分析了上市公司信息披露的过程,并提供了四阶段的动态博弈模型:一阶段分析表明上市公司管理者在无外部约束的情况下必然会选择"夸大"型信息披露方式;二阶段分析表明尽管审计公司可以拒绝上市公司虚假的信息披露,但这种威胁是不可信的;三阶段分析模型在监管者加入后对上市公司的威胁成为可信的,上市公司会进行诚实的信息披露;四阶段分析表明寻租的存在会使上市公司能够继续从事"夸大"型信息披露方式,并造成了社会资源的浪费。最后本文加入了不确定性的讨论并提出相关的建议。

The listed company＇s information disclosure can be taken as a complicated game about multiple par- ties. Based on the game theory, this paper studies the process of the listed company＇ s information disclosure, and pro- poses four stages dynamic game theory tree. In the one stage tree, we know that the listed company managers will choose the ＂exaggerated＂ information disclose without the external constraint. And from the two stages tree, we show that although the auditing firm can reject the exaggerated information disclose, but the threat is not credible. In the three stages tree, we join the regulator in the model, and we get the result that the listed company will choose the ＂hon- est＂ information disclose by the superise from the regulator. At the four stages game tree, we learn that the rent-seeking will make the listed company keeping the ＂exaggerated＂ information disclose and cause the waste of social resources. At last, we join the uncertainty in the game and get some important results, and we propose some suggestions based on the paper＇ s analysis.