企业违规行为与最优随机打击——一个实验研究

Corporate Misconduct and Optimal Random Crackdown——An Experimental Research

针对企业违规问题,在考虑企业风险偏好和决策理性程度异质的基础上建立模型,分析在面对监管打击时准完全理性企业群体和存在社会学习过程的有限理性企业群体的不同反应,借鉴最优随机打击理论,提出在资源约束条件下利用完全随机打击和随机分组打击两种方式对抑制两类企业群体的违规会得到不同的效果,通过实验对企业违规水平与监管部门的检查打击力度以及相同检查打击力度下不同实施方式间的关系进行验证。研究结果表明,企业违规水平与检查打击力度呈单调递减关系,但有限理性企业群体与检查打击力度呈二次曲线关系,准完全理性企业群体与检查打击力度呈线性关系;在相同的检查打击力度下,准完全理性群体在低检查打击力度时的违规比例会高于有限理性群体,在较高检查打击力度且完全随机检查打击方式下的违规比例会低于有限理性群体,在检查打击力度同样较高且采用随机分组打击方式的情况下,两群体的违规比例水平基本相当。此外,随机分组打击方式相对于完全随机打击方式对有限理性企业违规水平的降低效果更为明显。研究结论可以为监管部门选择打击方式提供参考。

Aiming at the corporate misconducts, with consideration of the corporation＇s heterogeneity in risk preference and decision-making rationality, we firstly set up a model and analyze the different reactions between the quasi-fully rational corporate groups and the bounded rational ones with social learning process when their violations are facing inspection and crackdown. Then, by referring the optimal random crackdown theory we predict that under resource constraint the ＂random crackdown mode＂ and the ＂random-grouped crackdown mode＂ will make different effects on these two type firms in reducing their violations. At last we test the relationship among the level of their misconducts, the supervision departments＇ inspection and crackdown intensity, and different crackdown modes with same intensity by carrying out laboratory experiment. The results show that the proportion of misconducts monotonically decrease with the inspection and crackdown intensity, but differently, the bounded rational corporations＇ violations quadratically relate to the inspection and crackdown intensity, while the quasi-fully rational corporations linearly do. When the two types of corporations are inspected with equal intensity, the quasi-fully rational ones＇ violation proportion is higher than that of bounded rational ones when the intensity is low, and this comparative relationship reverses with application of random crackdown mode when the intensity is high, but with the application of random-grouped crackdown mode both of the rates become almost equal. In addition, the random-grouped crackdown mode is more efficient to decrease the level of violation for the bounded rational corporations than the random crackdown mode. The results of this paper can offer reference for the supervision departments＇ choice of crackdown modes.