基于信号传递博弈的产业集群中小企业融资分析

An Analysis of SMEs' Financing in Industrial Clusters Based on a Signal Transmission Game Model

产业集群内中小企业多采用互助担保模式进行融资。他们的融资成功,不仅可以为中小企业的创新发展提供可能,同时也促进了产业集群的转型升级。本文为解决集群内中小企业融资过程中存在的逆向选择问题,提出了一个信号传递博弈模型,并对其分离均衡进行了分析。结果表明:担保公司应设置有效的担保机制,减小高收益能力企业加入共同担保基金时的出资额F1,增大低收益能力企业的出资额F2,同时提高可为高收益能力企业的担保比例n1;而集群内中小企业则应努力提高自身的收益能力θ,使之与低收益能力企业的θ2差距尽可能大。

Most of the SMEs in industrial clusters use mutual guarantee mode for their financing.Successful financing not only provides opportunities for the development of innovation of the SMEs themselves,but also promotes the transmission and upgrading of their industrial clusters.In this paper,a signal transmission game model is put forward to tackle the adverse selection problem existing in the financial process of SMEs in industrial clusters.After analyzing the separating equilibrium,the results show that： guarantee companies should set up an effective security mechanism,that can reduce the investment amounts F1 for companies with high-yield ability when they join to the guarantee projects,increase the investment amounts F2 for those with low-yield ability,and raise the guarantee ratio n1 for high-yield companies.Besides,SMEs in industrial clusters should strive to improve their earning capability θ,to widen the gap of θ2 from the low-yield companies as much as possible.