摘要
研究逆向选择下,委托人通过信号辅助改善信息结构后所面临的代理人信息租金抽取与配置效率的均衡决策问题。首先,分析讨论了完全信息下的最优契约和逆向选择下先验分布基础上的次优契约;之后,基于贝叶斯规则,将与代理人相关的外部信号及信号搜集成本纳入委托人的最优规划问题,对后验分布下的均衡变动进行了分析,给出了信号搜集成本可行预算集。研究表明,贝叶斯方法有利于委托人在信息租金与效率扭曲冲突中优化决策,为复杂环境下的实务契约设计逼近激励相容契约提供了量化参考依据。
The informational impact and information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with adverse selection in principal-agent problem are researched in the paper.First,the optimal contract with complete information and the second-best contract with incomplete informational anterior probability,both of them are represented based on the comprehensive review of the related literature.Second,the information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with Bayesian posterior probability is researched,and the constraint of signal procurement cost budget is described.As a result,the Bayesian method is helpful for making the optimal decision on information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off,and designing the incentive contract in practice.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期136-143,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家重点基础研究发展计划(973)项目资助(2007CB210307)
江苏省社科基金重点项目资助(12JZA004)
关键词
委托-代理
信息不对称
逆向选择
契约
贝叶斯规则
principal-agent
asymmetric information
adverse selection
contracts
Bayesian rule
