控制权扭曲的制度基础:不完全合同的视角

The Institutional Basis of Control Distortion:from the Perspective of an Incomplete Contract

现有文献对控制权扭曲的分析较为分散,这是导致各种具体机制难以遏制低效率行为(如过度注资、掏空、短期行为等)的主要原因之一。在对各种形式的控制权扭曲进行系统归纳的基础上提出了一种新的权力观,这有利于为设计更好的治理机制提供思路。我们认为,根据权力来源的不同,可以将权力划分为直接控制权、衍生控制权和代理控制权,每一种控制权都有与其相对应特有的控制权扭曲形式。直接控制权可能会造成事前的专用性投资不足以及事后的互相侵害;衍生控制权可能会造成纵向转移和横向转移资产;而代理控制权所造成的配置扭曲形式包括:权力交叉问题,短期行为问题、赢家通吃问题和优者出局问题。

The analysis of control is not consistent in existing economic papers; this is one of the causes which the inefficient behaviors cannot be reduced. Our paper classifies authority or power into three kinds： direct control, derivative control and delegating control. We think this classification helps to provide a unified framework to analyze kinds of control. Our paper explores the inefficiency of each allocation distort of control and helps to design better governance mechanism. Direct control may bring about underinvestment problems ex ante and aggrievement problems ex post. Derivative control may bring about vertical or horizontal assets transferring. Delegating control may bring about four kinds of distorts： power-crossing problem, short-term behavior problem, winner wins for all problem, and elitist out problem.