摘要
中国房地产企业的银行信贷依赖特征为探索银行监督与企业绩效之间的关系提供了良好的现实背景。论文以企业绩效作为公司治理效率的替代,基于银行监督与企业绩效的研究主线,深入分析了银行监督与企业绩效的关系。研究发现:银行监督对企业绩效产生了负面影响,国有房地产企业和银行的产权同源性特征是导致银行负债的杠杆治理效应被扭曲的重要原因;虽然银行负债的杠杆治理效应被扭曲,但是银行监督作为一种外部治理机制,其与内部治理机制之间存在交互效应,要么表现为替代关系,要么表现为互补关系。在中国当前的制度背景下,要发挥银行监督的功能,提高企业绩效,而且要解决中国银行出现的呆账和坏账问题,其根本出路就是要发挥杠杆治理的作用。
What Chinese real estate companies rely on bank credit provides a real background to explore a relationship between bank supervision and corporate performance. The paper takes corporate performance as a substitute to deeply analyze the relationship between bank supervi- sion and corporate performance. The study found that bank supervision has a negative impact on business performance, and state - owned enterprises of real estate and banks have the same property to cause leverage governance to be distorted. Although bank debt leverage governance is distorted, but banking supervision as external governance mechanism exists a replaceable or complementary relationship with its internal governance mechanisms.
出处
《科学决策》
2012年第7期1-37,共37页
Scientific Decision Making
关键词
银行监督
经营绩效
房地产上市公司
公司治理
banking supervision
business performance
real estate companies
corporate govemance
