不完全信息下存货质押业务防合谋机制设计

Mechanism Design of Avoiding Collusion in Inventory Financing under Incomplete Information

引入不完全信息下的重复博弈理论,建立存货质押业务管理中考虑防范物流企业与借款企业合谋银行契约设计的重复博弈模型。结果显示,在银行与物流企业信息不对称的委托监管模式下,银行应与物流企业建立长期合作关系避免单次交易,使物流企业有追随声誉模型带来的隐性激励积极性。

In order to prevent the collusion between the logistics enterprise and the borrower in inventory financing for the commercial bank, the theory of repeated game and reputation effect of incomplete information are introduced and the repeated games model is set up between the bank and logistics enterprise. The main results show that the bank should establish long-term relationship with logistics enterprise to avoid the single transaction, so that logistics enterprises have to follow the positive reputation effect.