管制俘获成因的定性比较分析

Research on the causes of regulatory capture:a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

针对现有管制理论始终未能对管制俘获成因给出有说服力的解释这一缺陷,采用模糊定性比较分析方法作为改进策略.通过对国内部分企业高管进行深度访谈,发现管制俘获现象背后隐藏着不同的交易模式,国有企业常通过自身影响力来影响政府出台对其有利的管制政策,而民营企业或初创企业则更多通过行政贿赂的方式俘获政府官员以换取政策的变通执行,与此同时,这种交易模式的差异性又与行业集中度及政府干预程度密切相关.

Since the existing regulation theory cannot give a persuasive explanation for regulatory capture causes, the root of capture and the hidden trade patterns in China were studied based on fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. Examining in-depth interviews of executives of several enterprises, it was found that there were several trading models hidden in regulatory capture. The state-owned enterprises had an impact on the formation of the basic rules of the game without necessarily involving private payments to public officials ; firms still wielded power over the politician. However, the methods by which private firms shaped the basic rules of the game were illicit and the private payments to public officials were not transparent. At the same time, the differences of such transactions were closely related to industry concentration and the degree of government intervention.