股权激励实施中股东、经理与审计师三方博弈分析

Analysis of Three Party Game among Shareholder,Manager and Auditor under Stock-based Compensation

股权激励是一把"双刃剑":一方面能起到降低代理成本的长期激励作用,另一方面也能诱发经理进行信息操纵。文章建立了一个股权激励实施中股东、经理与审计师之间的三方博弈模型来分析如何规避股权激励引致的经理信息操纵行为。通过对均衡解的分析得出以下结论:股东不断提高监控的技能及手段,加大对经理与审计师合谋操纵会计信息的惩罚力度,加强资本市场监管、提高资本市场的有效性能规避经理与审计师合谋操纵会计信息的行为。

Stock-based compensation is a ＂two-edged sword＂： on the one hand, it can decrease agent cost andplay a long-term Incentive role; on the other hand, it can induce managers to manipulate information. In this paper, the authors construct a three party game model among shareholders, manager and auditor to study how to prevent the manager manipulating information. The results show that shareholders improve the technical ability and measures to punish the manager and auditor heavily when they collude to manipulate financial information, to monitor stock market more frequently and improve the efficiency of capital market, which can avoid financial information manipulation.