摘要
本文分析了城市土地市场中地方政府权力寻租的表现、路径,并构建了相应的权力寻租模型,在此基础上,挖掘其滋生的制度环境,进而反思权力寻租的外部性和造成的危害,最后提出抑制性对策,以便为我国的公共管理提供有益参考。
This paper analyzes the performance and path of the public authority rent-seeking of local government in urban land market and builds a corresponding model.On this basis,the research mines the breeding system environment of the public authority rent-seeking,then reflects its externality and harm.At last,some suppression strategies are put forward in order to provide useful reference for our country's public administration.
出处
《特区经济》
2012年第8期212-214,共3页
Special Zone Economy
关键词
城市土地市场
地方政府
权力寻租
urban land market
local government
public authority rent-seeking