期刊文献+

定价权约束下的经销商机会主义行为防范——转售价格维持的新解释

The Opportunism Precaution of Dealers under the Pricing Rights Restriction——A New Explain of Resale Price Maintenance
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摘要 在电子商务和服务营销大行其道的今天,转售价格维持的经典理论依然囿于品牌内服务竞争的狭窄视野,对现实问题解释力不足。本文认为,企业采取RPM的动机,不是被动的避免销售服务市场失灵,而是更多地体现在掌握终端市场定价上。制造商掌握定价权有利于防范零售交易中机会主义行为,从而维护品牌商誉,树立消费者信心,同时也便于进取型企业积极展开市场价格竞争。 This paper holds that the motivation for firms to adopt RPM is embodied in controlling the price in the end market rather than passively avoiding the malfunction of the sales service market.If the manufacturer controls the pricing rights,the opportunism in retail transactions could be prevented,so that the goodwill of brands could be protected and customers' confidence could be built up,at the same time,it is also favorable for firms to compete in market price.
作者 崔春莹
机构地区 华中科技大学
出处 《工业技术经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第8期106-111,共6页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
关键词 转售价格维持 机会主义行为 服务营销 resale-price maintenance opportunism behavior services marketing
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