草地休牧政策交易成本测算研究

Measurement of transaction cost of rest-grazing policy

为了保护草地生态系统,我国草原地区政府出台了各种类型的草原休牧政策。这些生态治理政策实施的绩效如何,已经成为社会和学术界广泛关注而应着力研究的重大问题。本文将交易成本分析引入沙漠化地区草地休牧政策分析过程,确定交易成本由搜寻信息成本、签订合约成本、治理工程建设及营运成本、监督对方是否违约成本、违约后寻求赔偿成本共5部分构成。每个部分根据研究区域生态政策实施的关键节点进行指标分解,设计草地休牧政策交易成本分析的21个指标。根据在内蒙古自治区乌审旗的调研数据,测算乌审旗草地休牧政策在执行过程中的交易成本为906.05元·hm-2·a-1。其中,政府直接支付116.48元·hm-2·a-1,政府直接支付给牧户的休牧补偿费用占交易成本的12.86%;农户支付728.02元·hm-2·a-1,牧户支付占交易成本的80.35%,说明草地休牧的主要投资者不是政府而是牧户。政府直接支付是草地休牧机会成本的23.30%。草地休牧政策的政府支付达不到休牧机会成本的1/4,牧民利益受到损失,牧民偷牧率达到100%,致使草地休牧流于形式。生态政策的交易成本分析,将为不同生态建设政策的比较和绩效评价提供一个新的角度,具有重要意义。

A package of juristictive and administrative measures for conserving rest-grazing meadow ecosystems has been developed by various organs of government. Although much research has already been done in this area, it was still worthwhile and absolutely essential to assess the performance efficacy of existing measures on rest-grazing meadow ecosystems. This article attempted to probe into the assessment approach of existing measures about ecosystem governance, inherent interactions between jurisdictive/administrative measures and ecological protection, and the reason why unique measures have different efficacies. We studied existing measures that governed deserted meadows and introduced transaction-cost analysis approaches. In the study, transaction cost was identified in five parts--information search cost, contract signing cost, governance and operation cost, compliance and supervision cost, and compensation and remedy cost. Distinguished indicators were developed for each part based on the key nodes upon which the measures were conducted in the area and hence a total of 21 indicators were used. For Uxin Banner of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the total transaction cost was 906.05 Yuan.hm-2 per year according to investigation data. From this amount, 116.48 Yuan·hm-2 （12.86% of total transaction cost） was directly paid as compensatory fee by government to herder households. Then herder households in turn paid 728.02 Yuan.hm-2 （80.35% of total transaction cost） per year. Rather than government, the main investor in rest-grazing ecosystems was demonstratively herder households. On the other hand, direct government payment or opportunity cost of rest-grazing ecosystems was only 23.3%. Consequently, herder household interests were weakened, increasing stolen grazing rate in rest-grazing ecosystems to 100%. Measures of rest-grazing were therefore meaningless as long as government direct payments remained lower than 1/4 of the opportunity cost of rest-grazing ecosystems. Transaction cost analysis of jurisdictive and/or administrative measures addressing ecosystem problems provided monitoring and assessment perspectives to conservation measures of meadow ecosystems.