特殊普通合伙制、政府控制与审计师选择

Special General Partnership,State Ownership and Auditor Choice

本文从原有审计客户市场角度,研究事务所从有限责任制转变为特殊普通合伙制后是否会受到客户更多的选择。研究发现:当事务所从有限责任制转变为特殊普通合伙制以后,有更多的客户愿意选择其为年报审计师;非政府控制公司选择它们的意愿强于政府控制公司;在IPO审计市场也有类似的结果;事务所从有限责任制变为特殊普通合伙制后,更容易签发非标审计意见。

This paper investigates whether they get more engagement when audit firm becomes special general partnership from limited partnership on existing audit client. We find that the special general partnership audit firm will get more clients than limited partnership audit firm. And more, comparing to state ownership companies, nonstate ownership companies more hire them. Further, The IPO companies more hire them, too. In addition to, the special general partnership audit firm more issue modified audit opinions. This paper helps us understand the effect of special general partnership.