摘要
主流观点认为,制度是博弈过程中参与人的均衡策略,但对避免相向碰撞的行路规则的考察发现,现实中经济行为者采纳的惯例化规则远较制度的均衡策略论揭示的复杂多样。制度博弈均衡策略论的这种不充足解释力不仅仅是因为现有的制度博弈模型忽略了一些现实的基本行为策略,也因为博弈论框架只是一个有关社会交互问题的部分性分析框架,并不能覆盖所有的解决社会交互问题的方法。一个统一性的制度解释框架宜放弃博弈论的分析思路,更多地考虑制度的互补性问题。
The mainstream viewpoint believes that institution is the equilibrium strategy of all participants,but our survey on the rules of avoiding opposite collision shows that institutions in the reality are more complex than the conclusion of game theory model.The deficient explanatory capability of institutional game theory lies not only on scholars neglecting several basic behavior strategies,but also on the game theory is not an all-round analysis framework on social interactive question.We should give up game theory frame and pay more attention on the institutional complementarity on the exploration of the unified institution theory.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期35-40,共6页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
关键词
制度
博弈分析
行路规则
互补性
institution
game theory
walk rules
complementarity