专用性投资对企业绩效影响研究——产业技术投入的调节效应被引量：16

Dose specific asset matter? moderating effect of industry technology input

导出

摘要研究了企业所处产业技术投入的差别,会如何影响专用性投资和企业绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明:在高技术投入的产业中,增加专用性投资有利于提升企业绩效;但在低技术投入的产业中,增加专用性投资不利于企业绩效。这为我国企业参与全球价值链协作提供了启示,在要求较多技术投入的产业价值链中,可以保持较高水平的专用性投资;而在要求技术投入较低的产业价值链中,应该注重控制专用性投资的规模。 Specific asset have important value - creation properties, at the same time such asset pose considerable risk. Using the data of Chinese A share listed firms during 2007 - 2009, this paper analyses the relationships among Specific asset , Industry technology in- put and firm performance. The following factors are our main findings： Firstly, if there are no protect from governance mechanisms , specific asset will have negative effect on performance. Secondly, under condition of Industry technology input specific asset have posi- tive effect on performance.

作者于茂荐孙元欣

机构地区上海理工大学管理学院上海财经大学世博研究院

出处《科学学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第9期1363-1369,1353,共8页 Studies in Science of Science

基金教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(08JA630050) 上海理工大学博士科研启动经费资助项目(2011BS0302)

关键词专用性投资技术投入企业绩效 specific asset technology input firm performance

分类号 F274 [经济管理—企业管理]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献16

1Anderson E, Coughlan A T. International market entry and expansion via independent or integrated channels of distribution[ J]. Journal of Marketing, 1987,51 ( 1 ) :71 -82.
2Klein S,Frazier G L,Roth VJ. A transaction cost analy- sis model of channel integration in international markets [ J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1990,27 ( 5 ) : 196 - 208.
3Rokkan A I, Heide J B, Wathne K H. Specific invest- ments in marketing relationships: expropriation and bonding effects [ J ]. Journal of Marketing Research, 2003.40 ( 2 ) :210 - 224.
4Weiss A M,Kurland N. Holding distribution channel re- lationships together: the role of transaction - specific as- sets and length of prior relationship [ J ]. Organization Science, 1997,8 (6) :612 - 623.
5Dyer J. Does governance matter? Keiretsu alliances and asset specificity as sources of Japanese competitive ad- vantage[ J]. Organization Science, 1996,7 ( 6 ) : 649 - 666.
6Williamson O E. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives [ J ]. Ad- ministrative Science Quarterly, 1991, 36 ( 2 ) : 269 - 296.
7Klein B,Crawford R G,Alchian A. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978,21 (2) :297 -326.
8Hwang P. Asset specificity and the fear of exploitation [ J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006.60 ( 4 ) .423 - 438.
9汪涛,秦红.专用性投资对机会主义的影响——以汽车行业4S专营店为例[J].管理科学,2006,19(2):22-32. 被引量：25
10Jap S D. Pie- Expansion Efforts: collaboration proces- ses in buyer - seller relationships [ J]. Journal of Mar- keting Research, 1999,36 ( 3 ) :461 - 475.

二级参考文献85

1郭继强.企业制度中的组织剩余[J].学术月刊,2004,36(8):59-65. 被引量：3
2ALCHIAN. and H. DEMSETZ. Production, information cost, and economic organization[J] . American economic review, 1972, 62: 777-795.
3ALCHIAN. and S. WOODWARD. Reflections on the theory of the firm[J] . Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 1987, 143: 110-137.
4AOKI. The Co -operative Game Theory of the Firm[M]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
5COASE. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica, 1937, 4:386 - 405.
6DEMSETZ.所有权、控制和企业-论经济活动的组织(第一卷)[M]:中译本[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.204-230.
7DOW, G. K. Why capital hires labor: a bargaining perspective[J]. American Economic Review 1993, 83.
8GROSSMAN and HART. The cost and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration [J]. Journal of political economy, 1986, 94: 691 - 719.
9HART. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure[M]. Oxford: Clarendon. 1995.
10HART and J. MOORE. Property rights and the nature of the firm[J] . Journal of political economy , 1990, 98:1119- 1158.