在全球化中的私法和竞争政策

Private Law and Competition Policy in the Global Economy

私法和竞争政策之间的基本关系很简单:效力的市场以经济竞争为前提,在市场的独立交易者之间的商品自愿交换又有赖于合同实施的有效机制,因此,在奥尔多自由主义意义上的经济宪法,不仅是秩序法的一部分——其旨在反对政府方面(通过基本自由)和私人方面(通过反卡特尔法)限制以保护竞争,而且也包括交易法的一部分——其除了实体私法外,包括特别有效的争端解决和执法(私法保护)。然而,由于由国家组织的私法系统的跨国合同的实施是不够的,"制造还是购买"的决定在国际贸易中不利于在市场上"长臂"交易。因此,国际交易垂直纳入企业结构的程度相对高于在国内私法的庇护下进行的国内交易。世界市场的过度集中导致竞争激励机制减少和官僚成本上升。因此,与"更经济的方法"的基本假设相反,垂直结合本身不是促进在全球经济中的消费者福利。然而,因为这种过度集中是对跨境合同的国家保护欠缺的一个合理的反应,它不能被没有抑制跨境交流的严格的世界反托拉斯法所反对。因此,建立跨境合同实施的法律确定性的国际私法政策,似乎是目前促进全球经济竞争中的首选工具。

The fundamental nexus of private law and competition policy is mundane.. Economic compe- tition requires a functional market, which in turn requires effective institutions for the enforcement of contracts. The economic constitution in an ordo-liberal sense, therefore, consists not only of a regulatory part, which aims at protecting competition against state restrictions （fundamental freedoms） and private limitations （antitrust law） alike; it also entails a facilitative part, which aims at protecting individuals against opportunistic behavior of their transaction partners （private rights and remedies）. In this paper we criticize the so-called ＂more economic approach＂ to European competition law for disregarding the importance of a functional system of private law. Based on the availability of market governance as an alternative mode for organizing transactions, this approach presumes that vertical integration is economically efficient. Since the enforcement of crossborder contracts by state-organized systems of private law, however, is insufficient, ＂make or buy＂-decisions in international commerce are prejudiced against ＂arms＇ length＂ transactions on markets. Consequently international transactions are integrated vertically into firm-structures to a higher degree than comparable domestic transactions organized in the shadow of domestic private law. The resulting over-integration of world markets leads to reduced competitive incentives and high bureau- cratic costs, contrary to the fundamental assumptions of the ＂more economic approach＂, vertical integration does, therefore, not per se foster consumer welfare in the global economy. However, as this over-integration is a reasonable reaction to the deficits in state protection of cross-border contracts, it cannot be countered by a strict world antitrust law without suppressing cross-border exchange. Thus, international private law policy establishing legal certainty in the enforcement of cross-border contracts currently seems to be the instrument of choice in promoting competition in the global economy.