上市公司控股股东自利性并购的隧道阻遏研究

Prevention of Self-interest Acquisition of Holding Shareholder of Listed Companies

日渐活跃的企业并购在给我国上市公司带来发展繁荣的同时,亦为控股股东的自利性行为提供了新的媒介和手段,其往往通过与上市公司之间股权、资产的移转来实现利益输送,不断侵蚀中小股东的利益,掏空上市公司,而立法上的缺漏和监管上的匮乏却对此捉襟见肘。面对屡见不鲜的控股股东自利性并购,法律的不完备性日渐显现,使得私法诉讼难以成为有效的利益输送阻遏手段,而建立有效的证券监管体制和自律机制将能有效补充司法处理的短板。因此,针对控股股东愈渐隐蔽化的自利性并购行为,应该以"分而治之"的思路建构全景式的三维法律治理方案,从司法救济、证券监管和上市公司治理结构优化等制度维度进行全面治理,特别是通过优化证券监管职权配置和明确控股股东信义义务来增强阻吓频度与力度,最终有效阻遏控股股东的利益输送行为,促进我国上市公司与国民经济的健康发展。

While bringing prosperity to listed companies in China, growing merges in China have to some extent become a novel media aswell as means of the holding shareholder to pursue their own interest. They normally transmit away the company＇ s property by way of transferring company＇ s stocks or capitals so as to infringe small and median shareholders＇ benefits and bring the company onto the brim of insolvency, for which people can do little because of absence of relevant laws and administrative regulation. To solve this problem, we must endeavor to establish security regulatory system and self-discipline system and strengthen regulation from the perspective of judicial remedy, securities supervision and listed company governance so as ultimately effectively prevent the holding shareholder＇ s interest transmission act and promote healthy development of China＇s listed companies and national economy.