股权性质、环境不确定性与会计信息的治理效应

State Ownership,Environment Uncertainty and Governance Role of Accounting Information

已有研究发现会计信息具有治理效应,但没有考虑会计信息治理效应所依赖的经理人侵占动机及外部环境所提供的机会;已有研究虽然考察了国有股权的治理效应,但由于没有考虑经理人谋取私利的可能性而使结论具有偏差。本文研究了股权性质、环境不确定性与会计信息质量对代理成本的交互作用。研究结果表明,低质量的会计信息不仅增加管理层利用公司资源的自利行为,而且还降低公司资产的使用效率,但会计信息的治理作用仅在环境不确定性高的公司中存在,同时,相对于非国有控股公司,会计信息质量在国有控股公司的治理作用较小。研究结果还表明,只有在环境不确定性较高且会计信息质量较低的情况下,国有控股公司的代理效率高于非国有控股公司。本文不仅验证了国有股权和环境不确定性对会计信息治理效应的影响,也验证了环境不确定性和会计信息质量对国有股权治理效应的影响。

Prior literatures reveal that accounting information plays governance role in monitoring manager's behavior, but manager's incentives in pursuit private benefits and opportunities provided by external environment which will affect the governance role of accounting information are not considered. Although prior researches study the governance role of state ownership, but without considering the probability of pursuing private benefits, conclusions are biased. This paper tests the interaction effect of state ownership, environment uncertainty and accounting information quality on agency cost. Results show that firms with lower accounting information quality not only spend more expenditure on manager's consumptions, but also operate less efficiently. Further studies show that this effect only exists in companies which environment uncertainty is higher. Compared with non-state-owned companies, the governance role of accounting information is smaller in state-owned companies. Results also demonstrate that the operate efficiency is higher for state-owned companies than non-stated owned companies only when environment uncertainty and information asymmetry are higher. This paper not only verifies the effect of state ownership and environment uncertainty on the governance role of accounting information, but also confirms that the governance role of state ownership is affected by environment uncertainty and accounting information quality.