基于GONE理论的上市公司财务报告舞弊识别研究

Research on the Identification of Listed Companies' Financial Reporting Fraud: Based on GONG Theory

本文基于GONE理论,剖析了财务报告舞弊诱因的影响机理和舞弊行为的决策权衡机理,并选取2006～2009年因财务舞弊受处罚的上市公司为样本,实证分析了贪婪、机会、需要和暴露四因素与财务报告舞弊的关系,结果发现:在控制了一系列因素以后,管理层的风险偏好和剩余索取权引发的个体贪婪程度越高,治理结构不完善制造的舞弊机会越多,增发配股引发的组织需要程度越高,舞弊的可能性越大;审计意见类型和会计师事务所变更代表的发现机制越完善,暴露的可能性越大,舞弊的可能性越小。

Based on the GONE Theory, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of financial reporting fraud incentives and the decisional balance mechanism of fraud, selects some listed companies that punished from 2006 to 2009 because of financial reporting fraud as samples and then does an empirical analysis to the relationship between financial reporting fraud and the four factors: greed, opportunities, needs and exposure. With the control of a series of factors, we find the following results: the higher the individual greed raised by risk preference and residual claim rights of the management and the more imperfect the corporate governance structures, the more opportunities to conduct fraud; the higher degree of organization need caused by additional rights issues, the more possibilities of fraudulent practices; the more complete the discovery mechanisms reflected by the types of audit opinions and the changes of accounting firms ,the more possibilities to expose financial position, thus there will be less possibilities to conduct fraud.