金融监管与金融创新的进化博弈分析

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Supervision and Innovation

全球金融危机爆发使各国开始重新审视金融创新与金融监管之间的关系。本文运用非对称进化博弈理论,构建金融机构和监管机构之间的非对称进化博弈模型,分析两者的长期动态博弈关系,得到创新与监管的长期进化稳定均衡点,分析了金融机构进行创新和监管机构监管相互作用的影响因素,并提出加强市场约束与官方监管的有效结合、合理利用监管机构处罚机制、建立事前防范机制等政策建议。

The global financial crisis made all countries begin to take a new look at the relationship between financial innovation and financial supervision. Based on the asymmetric evolutionary game theory, this paper tries to build the asymmetric evolutionary game model between the financial institutions and the regulation authority and analyses their long- term dynamic game relationship. As a result, the paper derived the long-term evolutionary stable equilibrium of innovation and supervision. Meanwhile, it also analysed the factors that influenced the interaction of financial institutions＇ innovation and regulation authority＇s supervision, and put forward policy suggestions that strengthen the effective combination between the market restriction and official supervision, utilize regulators punishment mechanism reasonably, establish prevention mechanism and so forth.