所有制性质对中国企业议价能力的影响

The Impact of Ownership on Bargaining Power of Firms in China

Schelling-Muthoo讨价还价思想认为,谈判中让步的成本越小,获得的谈判收益越少。我国部分企业由于存在预算软约束、损失转嫁、多重委托代理等问题,弱化了据理力争的激励,因而在谈判中容易过度让步。本文运用正向求解方法证明了Schelling-Muthoo谈判解,并用自己发展出来的四象限作图方法展示了这一结果。进而运用1999-2007年中国150多万家企业的微观数据进行实证检验,结果发现国有企业和集体企业的中间投入品购买成本显著高于民营企业,表明国有企业和集体企业讨价还价能力较低,因而中国只有继续推进市场化改革,才能对内优化资源配置、对外捍卫国际合作利益。

The idea of Schelling-Muthoo bargaining theory is that the smaller concession cost is, the less benefit receives. There are soft budget constraints, loss transition ability for some Chinese enterprises, which can weaken incentives of stick its position, so these firms would concede too much. The authors forwardly prove Schelling-Muthoo Negotiation Solution, and illustrate the result using four-quadrant mapping method. Then the authors make an empirical test using more than 1.5 millions firm-level data, and find that the purchasing cost of state-owned and collective enterprises are significantly higher than those of private enterprise. Those results reflect the bargaining power of state-owned enterprises is lower, therefore market economy reforms should be promoted to optimize resource allocation and defense the interest of international cooperation.