休谟的怀疑论与知识的二重性

Hume’s Scepticism and Dualism of Knowledge

历史上各种类型的怀疑论本质上包含这样一个共同的观点:我们没有知识。同样,休谟的怀疑论也可以理解为:我们缺乏知识。但是,休谟虽然否认我们拥有排除怀疑的确定性意义上的知识,却并不否认我们拥有后来所称的"得到辩护的真实信念"这种意义的知识。休谟的知识观由此可以称作知识二重性论题。这种知识的区分虽然预示人们所熟悉的分析与综合的二分,但同时也暗示蒯因后来对这种区分的攻击以及这种二分的消解。

Various kinds of scepticism in history of philosophy essentially contain such a common view that we humans have no knowledge. Likewise, Hume＇s scepticism can be understood as that we lack knowledge. Although Hurne denied that we had the knowledge in the sense which contained certainty excluding skepticism, he didn＇t deny that we had the knowledge that was justified true knowledge. We consider Hume＇s view of knowledge as a thesis of knowledge dualism. The distinction of knowledge indicates the well-known analytic/synthetic distinction, while it implies Quine＇s assault on this distinction and the resolution of this two distinction as well.