大国地方政府间税收竞争策略研究——基于中国经验数据的空间计量面板模型

An Empirical Research on The Tax Competition Strategy among The Big Power’s Local Governments ———Based on the Spatial Econometric Panel Model Of China’s Data

实证研究结果表明所有的税收竞争反应系数都显著为正,证明了中国地方政府间存在着正向的税收竞争,采取的是互补性的税收竞争策略;分税制改革以后的税收竞争反应系数普遍大于分税制改革以前,说明分税制改革以后中国地方政府间的税收竞争较之分税制改革以前更加激烈。这带给我们如下启示:大国地方政府间的税收竞争是必然的,要避免"一竞到底",就应该制定合理的竞争规则,建立科学的民主决策机制、评价机制和大国区域间税收利益协调机制。

Under the condition without intercept term, the positive research results indicate all reaction coefficients of tax competition are evidently positive. So it proves no matter of before the separate tax system reform or after, there is a positive-going tax competition among Chinese local governments and they adopt the complementary t~ competition strategy. While all reaction coefficients of tax competition after the separate tax system reform are greater than before, which proves that tax competition among Chinese local governments after the separate tax system reform is more furious than before. So the big power＇s tax competition among local governments is inevitable. In order to avoid ＂race to bottom＂, it is necessary to set down reasonable competition rules, establish scientific democratic decision-making mechanism and evaluating system and the big power＇s tax cooperating system among regions.