摘要
以只有供应商与经销商的二级供应链为研究对象,在经销商需求预测信息不对称条件下分析了有三个参与者的二级供应链协作机制,设计了最优激励契约进行信息甄别与渠道协作,并分析了其有效的原因,给出了算例。结论表明:在信息不对称条件下,制造商针对不同类型的经销商设置与之相应的提前采购批发价,可以激励经销商们各自向供应商传递真实需求信息并将供应链库存在三个参与者间进行合理分配,避免三方博弈最终起到协调渠道库存的作用。
The supply chain coordination mechanism for an supply chain composed of one supplier and two agencies is studied in this paper.The incentive contract under asymmetric information of the agency’s demand information are given,and analyze the reason of its effect.Conclusions demonstrate that incentive contract with different price for different agency can coordinate supply chain under asymmetric information,it can encourage the agencies to share the credible demand information with supplier though advance purchase quantity,allot the inventory between the three parts reasonably.A numerical study is given.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期31-37,共7页
Industrial Engineering and Management
关键词
信息不对称
多参与者
信息甄别
供应链协作
asymmetric information; multi-player; information screening; supply chain coordination