基于纳什谈判的外商进入模式分析

Foreign Firm's Entry Mode Analysis Based on Nash Bargaining

本文在纳什谈判的框架下比较分析了四种外商进入模式:出口、技术许可、绿地FDI、投资兼并。对应于出口或绿地FDI,外商与本国厂商进行古诺竞争。对应于技术许可或投资兼并,它们通过纳什谈判分享合谋利润,其中出口和FDI分别构成了技术许可和投资兼并谈判的纳什威胁点。最终,外商通过比较投资兼并和技术许可决定其进入模式。本文对FDI的动因给出了一个"以打促谈"的全新解释:尽管设立FDI需要外商支付一定的固定成本,但借此它可以在投资兼并谈判中拥有更多的谈判优势。分析表明,本国市场容量越大、外国工资越高、本国关税越高、本国工资越低、FDI成本越小,外商越容易采取FDI和兼并策略。但更加有趣的是,如果外商拥有的是"适宜技术",即技术差距不是太大或太小时,它更有可能采取投资兼并策略。

A foreign firm with advanced technology can enter domestic market through four modes： export, licensing, greenfield FDI, or investment merger （IM）. Under export or greenfield FDI, the foreign firm plays Cournot with a domestic firm. But under licensing or IM, the two firms divide collusive monopoly profit through Nash bargaining with export outcome as the threat point for licensing and FDI outcome as the threat point for IM. The foreign firm thus compares licensing and IM to determine its entry mode. We propose a novel motivation for greenfield FDI： although incurring a sunk cost, it may increase foreign firm＇ s profit by increasing its bargaining power in IM. We show that the incentive for FDI increases in domestic market scope, foreign wage rate and domestic tariff but decrease in domestic wage rate and sunk cost for FDI. More interestingly, when the foreign firm has ＂appropriate technology＂ （ i. e. when technology gap is not very large or very small）, its incentives for IM will be larger.