债务治理、高质量审计与自由现金流过度投资——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

Debt Governance,High Quality Audit and Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow

以2003～2009年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察高质量审计与银行借款的交互作用对自由现金流过度投资的影响。研究发现:银行借款可以显著地缓解自由现金流过度投资问题,该缓解效应主要来自于短期借款;随着高质量审计的引入,银行借款缓解自由现金流过度投资的效应更显著,表明高质量审计与债务治理机制之间存在协同效应;进一步检验还发现,高质量审计与银行债务治理机制间的协同效应更显著地存在于金融发展程度高的非国有上市公司中。

Selecting a sample of A-Share listed firms from 2003 to 2009, this paper investigates the effect of the interrelation- ship between high-quality auditing and bank loans on overinvestment of free cash flow. The main findings as following： bank loans can relieve the overinvestment of free cash flow, and this alleviating effects are mainly caused by short-term loans; with the introduction of high-quality auditing, the alleviating effects of overinvestment of free cash flow induced by bank loans are more significant, which im- plicates that there are synergistic effects between high-quality auditing and the governance mechanism of loans. Further research sug- gests that the synergistic effects of high-quality auditing services and the governance mechanism of loans are more significant for non- state-owned listed firms in the high financial development market.